Environmental regulatory enforcement with "green" consumers

  1. Rodríguez Ibeas, Roberto 1
  1. 1 Universidad de La Rioja
    info

    Universidad de La Rioja

    Logroño, España

    ROR https://ror.org/0553yr311

Revista:
Spanish economic review

ISSN: 1435-5469

Año de publicación: 2006

Volumen: 8

Número: 4

Páginas: 271-283

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1007/S10108-006-9015-X DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: Spanish economic review

Repositorio institucional: lock_openAcceso abierto Editor

Resumen

We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of ¿green¿ consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet